Tony made an interesting comment on my Remote Access Post from a few days ago. He has a good point, and I think it’s worth visiting. We do we give remote access to and from what computers. Is it a good idea to allow them access from their personal computers? I have had the same thought, and that is the primary reason I’m not already doing it. Here’s a few thoughts:

Generally, only a user with a church supplied laptop would be given VPN rights. If the user has been granted the right to log in via VPN, though, can I really control what machine they do it from? I really can’t. All they need is the Cisco VPN client and a few configuration details, so, in theory, a tech-savy user could access the VPN from any computer.

• Is it any different from a rogue computer being physically plugged into the network? No, it’s really not. Now, random machines being attached to the network is definitely not something I promote or desire. But, it would take very extreme measures and a lot of expense to stop it. 802.1x is a possibility, but, beyond that, it would require some sort of centralized MAC Address based authentication. This exists from a few vendors, but isn’t cheap. Bottom line is, it’s not easy or cheap to keep rogue machines out completely.
• Putting costs and implementation issues aside, what impact would it have on ministry to implement the above? Are there legitimate reasons for someone to attach a “rogue” machine to the network? In general, no, but there are some exceptions.
• We live in an increasingly “connected” and mobile society. Ministry is no exception. Increasingly, being on the cutting edge of technology is a requirement of our ministry. It is absolutely critical that we enable our staff to perform their duties without being physically present in the office.

So, with the above in mind, I’ve placed a greater focus on keeping our internal defenses in line. Here’s a few actions I’ve taken or plan to take:

• Windows firewall is enabled on all workstations via group policy and no programs are allowed to create exceptions. There are only a handful of ports allowed.
• This is a no-brainer, but centrally managed anti-virus is in place on all internal machines.
• SMTP is not allowed outbound from anywhere on the network, with the exception of our exchange servers. This limits the scope of damage should a machine with a mass-mailing worm show up on the network.
• Access to network file shares is very carefully controlled. User accounts do not have access to anything they do not specifically needs to access for their job function.

After putting a lot of thought into it, I’ve come to the conclusion that the benefits to allowing VPN access outweigh the potential negative impact of not allowing it. I would rather allow limited access via other methods of possible, which is why I’m exploring Terminal Services Web Access combined with RemoteApp. But, if for some reason the Terminal Services solution does not work out, I believe VPN is an acceptable fall-back.